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A call for national
ethical guidelines
Pamela Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke
Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney, Australia
Abstract
Judicial analytics is the use of data to monitor, understand and predict judicial behaviour. This is a global phenomenon and
a cause for both celebration and concern. Given the unique role of courts and the potential for judicial analytics to
undermine the rule of law, there is a need to review and revise the current inertia in the Australian regulatory approach
to this issue. This article calls for the development of professional ethical guidelines for law and other disciplines, to
assist and guide the creation and dissemination of predictive judicial analytics.
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There is a global divergence in regulatory approach to
the use of ‘judicial analytics’. The term ‘judicial analytics’
describes the analysis of data (including judgments and
other public records of the work of judges) using artifi-
cial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to monitor,
understand or predict judicial behaviour. In 2019, in a
global first, France criminalised the publication of judicial
analytics with penalties of up to five years in prison.1 The
new Article 33 of the French Justice Reform Act reads:
‘No personally identifiable data concerning judges or
court clerks may be subject to any reuse with the pur-
pose or result of evaluating, analyzing or predicting their
actual or supposed professional practices’.2
In contrast, the Australian approach to the use of data
analytics to measure judicial performance and even to
predict judicial behaviour (predictive analytics) is one
of regulatory silence. This silence is noteworthy given
the emerging use of judicial analytics in Australia by
courts, academics, media and other commentators
across public fora.
This article outlines this use of judicial analytics in
Australia before discussing the benefit and disadvantage
of such use. Importantly, our focus is not upon the
responsible use of data to measure past judicial efficiency
or the use of metadata in civil proceedings or analysis of
types and volumes of cases heard as presented in
Courts’ Annual Reports. Instead, we are most con-
cerned with the use of data to predict judicial behaviour
and case outcomes. In conclusion, we advocate the
development of professional ethical guidelines, for law
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2Jason Tashea, ‘France Bans Publishing of Judicial Analytics and Prompts Criminal Penalty’ ABA Journal (online, 7 June 2019) http://www.abajournal.com/
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and other disciplines, to assist and guide the creation and
dissemination of predictive judicial analytics.
Use of judicial analytics by courts,
academics, commercial publishers and
commentators: Australia and the US
The use of quantitative methods to ‘predict’ judicial
behaviour is well established in legal research, especially
in the United States (US). In 1922, Haines, a political
scientist, published an article in the Illinois Law Review3
reviewing 15,000 decisions about public intoxication and
linking outcomes to the personal traits of the New York
magistrates. In the 1940s, Pritchett, again a political sci-
entist, published a book charting dissent in the US
Supreme Court.4 From these humble beginnings, the
research-scape concerning judicial behaviour in the US
is today dominated by three principal commercial pro-
viders of legal analytics services: LexisNexis (owning Lex
Machina and Ravel Law), Bloomberg Litigation Analytics
and Premonition Analytics. All facilitate research about
the behaviour of judges assigned to cases. They claim to
provide analysis of individual judges’ past rulings in spe-
cific types of cases, comparisons between judges and the
arguments that particular judges find persuasive.
American companies such as Gavelytics use AI across
very large databases to ascertain whether judges will
make ‘favourable’ rulings based upon data about ‘past
rulings, judicial workload, and biographical information’.5
In 2017, a generalised model was claimed to predict the
behaviour of the US Supreme Court with up to 71.9 per
cent accuracy.6
The Australian development of judicial analytics and in
particular predictive analytics lags behind other jurisdic-
tions, especially the US. There is nevertheless a wide and
growing spectrum of studies of Australian courts which
use data to draw conclusions about court and individual
judicial performance.7 Australian scholarship also dis-
cusses the use of legal data analytics in diverse areas
including: the use of big data in policing,8 automation
across administrative law decision making,9 data collection
and privacy,10 outcomes in defamation cases11 and crim-
inal sentencing.12 Judicial analytics is currently only inhib-
ited in Australia by the manner in which legal records are
made available by the courts. They are not conducive to
efficient data collation and analysis or to AI machine learn-
ing.13 However, the capacity to undertake judicial analytics
scholarship is growing. Commercial legal publishers such
as LexisNexis now provide legal analytics platforms.
International publishers such as Premonition have already
produced a report on both judges’ and lawyers’ success
rates in Australia based upon scraping publicly available
records.14 Toby Unwin, the Premonition CIO and co-
founder, observed that ‘[o]ur data has proven that a cli-
ent’s choice of firm or barrister has a 30.7% impact on
whether they win their cases’.15 Learning from the US
experience, an escalation of Australian predictive judicial
analytics, is now certain to follow.
The use of data to measure past judicial
performance: A cause for celebration
and concern
Data analytics is already the subject of ongoing criticism
in terms of its application to the past performance of the
3Charles Grove Haines, ‘General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges’ (1922) 17
Illinois Law Review 96.
4C Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937–1947 (Macmillan, 1948).
5Agnieszka McPeak, ‘Disruptive Technology and the Ethical Lawyer’ (2019) 50 University of Toledo Law Review 457, 464.
6Daniel Martin Katz, Michael J Bommarito and Josh Blackman, ‘A General Approach for Predicting the Behaviour of the Supreme Court of the United
States’ (2017) 12(4) PLoS One e0174698: 1–18.
7Natasha Robinson, ‘Federal Circuit Court Judge Alexander Street Accused of Bias after Rejecting Hundreds of Migration Cases’ ABC News (Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, 10 September 2015) https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-10/federal-court-judge-alexander-street-accused-of-bias/
6764704; Sydney Tilmouth, ‘The Wrong Direction: A case study and anatomy of successful Australian criminal appeals’ (2015) 40(1) Australian Bar
Review 18; Nigel Stobbs and Geraldine Mackenzie, ‘Evaluating the Performance of Indigenous Sentencing Courts’ (2009) 13(2) Australian Indigenous Law
Review 90; Russell Smythe, ‘What Do Intermediate Appellate Courts Cite? A Quantitative Study of the Citation Practice of Australian State Supreme
Courts’ (1999) 21 Adelaide Law Review 51; KPMG, Evaluation of the Drug Court of Victoria (Final Report, Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, 18 December
2014); Anne Wallace, Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack, ‘Evaluating Judicial Performance for Caseload Allocation’ (2015) 41(2) Monash University
Law Review 447; Brian Opeskin, ‘The State of the Judicature: A Statistical profile of Australian Courts and Judges’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 489;
Andrew Lynch, ‘The Gleeson Court on Constitutional Law: An Empirical Analysis of its First Five Years’ (2003) 26(1) University of NSW Law Journal 32;
David Carter, James Brown and Adel Rahmani, ’Reading the High Court at a Distance: Topic Modelling the Legal Subject Matter and Judicial Activity of
the High Court of Australia, 1903–2015’ (2016) 39(4) University of NSW Law Journal 1300; Matthew Groves and Russell Smyth, ‘A Century of Judicial
Style: Changing Patterns in Judgment Writing on the High Court 1903-2001’ (2004) 32(2) Federal Law Review 255.
8Lyria Bennett Moses and Janet Chan, ‘Using Big Data for Legal and Law Enforcement Decisions: Testing the New Tools’ (2014) 37(2) University of NSW
Law Journal 643.
9Yee-Fui Ng and Maria O’Sullivan, ‘Deliberation and Automation: When is a decision a "decision"?’ (2019) 26(1) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 21.
10Melissa de Zwart, Sal Humphreys and Beatrix van Dissel, ‘Surveillance, Big Data and Democracy: Lessons for Australia from the US and UK’ (2014)
37(2) University of NSW Law Journal 13.
11Judith Gibson, ‘Identifying Defamation Law Reform Issues: A “snapshot” view of defamation judgment data’ (2019) 23(1) Media and Arts Law Review 4.
12Nigel Stobbs, Dan Hunter and Mirko Bagaric ‘Can Sentencing Be Enhanced by the Use of Artificial Intelligence?’ (2017) 41(5) Criminal Law Journal 261.
13Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke, ‘High Court Negligence Cases 2000–10’ (2014) 36(4) Sydney Law Review 585.
14Premonition (Web Page) https://www.premonition.ai/reports/.
15‘Legal Analytics Firm, Premoniton, Publishes Statistical Ranking of Australia’s Top Law Firms and Barristers’, Premonition News (Web page, 6
September 2017). https://premonition.ai/legal-analytics-firm-premoniton-publishes-statistical-ranking-australias-top-law-firms-barristers/.
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judiciary. Here, there are fundamental attitudinal differ-
ences between Australia and the US. As Robinson
observes:
The American preoccupation with explaining judicial
decision making with statistics has long been antithetical
to Westminster scholars. . .The notion that decisions
can be explained in quantitative terms by an empirical
analysis of the statistical patterning of judicial votes is
foreign to Westminster sensibilities.16
Robinson’s assertion is borne out by Australian public
debate about the use of data to measure judicial per-
formance. In October 2018, Aaron Patrick wrote a
series of articles in the Australian Financial Review
(AFR) criticising the speed of the Federal Court.17 In
one article, he revealed that 39 out of 69 judges had
taken more than a year to write a judgment.18 The
judges were named although Patrick conceded, ‘[m]
any of the details of 11,000 cases “scraped” from the
internet are one-day procedural hearings’.19 Patrick also
reported that a ‘court spokesman’ (sic) had challenged
the validity of the data analysis, saying it ‘was
“fundamentally flawed”’ and that ‘[t]he AFR’s approach
is a simplistic and limited numerical analysis that fails to
provide any meaningful insight into the quantitative and
qualitative breadth and nature of the work of the court
as an institution’.20
This debate between the Federal Court and the AFR
illustrates both the usefulness of data for judicial
accountability and performance measurement as well
as the fundamental problem of data analysis.
A central tenet of this debate is data utility versus
data accuracy. In terms of utility, public confidence in
the administration of justice is integral to the rule of
law. The public has an interest in the efficient and fair
operation of state institutions. The use of predictive
analytics can help litigants decide whether to bring
cases, decide strategies and tactics. Moreover, data
analysis of judicial performance ‘disrupts’ the legal pro-
fession, shining light onto performance and success. In
this sense, the use of judicial analytics is a cause for
celebration even though it has been criticised as a blunt
instrument for judicial performance management. On
the other hand, concern about the inaccuracy of data
analysis is aptly captured by judicial officers themselves.
For example, former Chief Justice Gleeson observed
in 2004:
Because the High Court deals with a relatively small
number of cases, major statistical variations can result
from random causes. I have pointed out to the other
Justices that we could make large productivity gains by
arranging that special leave applications or appeals that
are now listed and heard together be listed and counted
separately.21
This observation highlights the danger in simply counting
judgments, the point being that the science of counting
can itself be influenced by changing what is counted.
Predictive analytics and litigation
outcomes: Promoting the rule of law
Measuring past judicial performance and court efficiency
is just one aspect of legal analytics. Formal predictive
analysis of litigation outcomes enabled by AI using
large legal databases goes much further. It seeks to
enable lawyers to predict how cases will be decided by
particular courts or judges.
It might be argued that this is simply a more reliable
evidence-based way of doing what has always been done.
Within a legal community, there will always be a kind of
informal predictive analysis of litigation outcomes, espe-
cially in areas of legal practice where there is a specialist
bar operating. There, the members of the profession
know by virtue of their experience, the litigation tactics
and arguments that will be most persuasive and they
know the idiosyncrasies of individual judges and their
views about particular legal doctrines. They know the
broad approaches of individual judges to development
of the law. Judicial analytics has the advantage of formal-
ising knowledge that was previously anecdotal.
Moreover, data analytics is undoubtedly a growing part
of the future of the legal profession: data literacy is now
seen as an essential skill for new lawyers.22
Judicial analytics can also be viewed as important for
upholding and applying the rule of law. The rule of law is
part of the Australian Constitution23 and requires that all
members of a society are equally subject to publicly avail-
able legal codes and processes.24 The transparency that
data analysis offers across judicial decision making
16Zoe Robinson, ‘Comparative Judicial Attitudinalism: A Preliminary Study of Judicial Choices in Westminster Legal Systems’ (2011) 1 The University of
Chicago Legal Forum 209.
17See especially, Aaron Patrick, ‘Federal Court Speed of Justice can be a Lottery’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 26 October 2018) 32; Aaron
Patrick, ‘Public Servants Need to Face Scrutiny, but Who Judges the Judges?’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 26 October 2018) 32.
18Aaron Patrick, ‘Frustration over Federal Court Judgment Delays’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 27 October 2018) 6.
19Aaron Patrick, ‘Public Servants Need to Face Scrutiny, but Who Judges the Judges?’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 26 October 2018) 32.
20Aaron Patrick, ‘In Federal Court, Wheels of Justice Turn Slowly: Exclusive’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 26 October 2018) 3.
21Murray Gleeson CJ, ‘The High Court of Australia: Challenges for its New Century’ (Speech, Constitutional Law Conference, 20 February 2004)
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/gleesoncj/cj_20feb04.html.
22The Law Society of NSW, flip: The Future of Law in the Profession, Commission of Inquiry (Web Page, 2017) https://www.lawsociety.com.au/sites/
default/files/2018-03/1272952.pdf.
23South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 (French CJ) [42].
24Geoffrey de Q Walker, The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (Melbourne University Press, 1988).
Stewart and Stuhmcke 3
arguably promotes the rule of law, ensuring judges are
subject to open and transparent processes of account-
ability for their decision making. The benefit of data ana-
lytics is that it will to serve the two ‘publics’ of the
judiciary: society in general and the individuals who inter-
act with courts, from litigants to lawyers. It will benefit
the former by enhancing public confidence in the
judicial process and the latter by clarifying and making
available for scrutiny an important component of the
Court’s work.
But there are some fundamental problems with pre-
dictive analytics. Not only is the use of data to measure
judicial performance and predict litigation outcomes
never as nuanced as the conclusions drawn from the
collective experience of a specialist bar, such use of
legal information may also undermine the rule of law.
Predictive analytics: Undermining the
rule of law
Any technology that has the capacity to influence the
work of the courts and the corpus of the law must be
approached with caution. There is a distinction between
using data analytics to improve the system of administra-
tion of justice and the use of predictive analytics that may
shape and influence the outcomes of cases and even the
development of the law itself.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of prediction
models applied to the fundamental functions of the judi-
cial system, is that core rule of law values may be endan-
gered. Predictive analysis uses data and patterns that
ignore legal precedent and the specifics of individual
cases. Analytics codes legal information into separate
machine readable parts which can then be analysed,
reducing the normative framework of the justice
system and law into patterns and numbers.25 With
respect to judicial and predictive analytics, the data is
created from the legal process itself, from the corpus
of the law, and it is this which generates new knowledge.
The organic development of law through precedent is
transformed into algorithms rather than being recog-
nised as a judicially refined body of legal regulation devel-
oped on a case-by-case basis.
In this sense, analytics is more than a reporter or
analyser of legal information. Predictive analytics uses
the law as a form of legal information to engage with
and shape the law and the legal system itself. This use
of data, or legal information as data, has the potential to
determine litigation and courtroom tactics, the legal
arguments advanced by counsel and may influence law-
yers’ approaches to legal doctrine. The prediction of
judicial outcomes will influence final litigation results,
as litigants withdraw or settle claims on the basis of
predictions. Ultimately over time, these subtle influences
can shape legal principle.
This shaping is inevitable as data is now relied upon
to assert truths. Presented as ‘science’, AI-generated
predictive analysis takes on the attributes and biases
of the society in which it operates in two main ways.
Firstly, predictive data is only as good as its input and
outcomes will reflect the bias or limitations of a human
coder or those inherent in the judgments and docu-
ments from which data is extracted. Secondly, predic-
tive judicial analytics will likely become a tool used by
the most seasoned and advantaged litigants who have
access to sophisticated data analytics systems. Access
to justice inequalities in the Australian system is well
known26 and predictive analytics may become yet
another factor advantaging the most capable litigants
over others.
Further, the intangibles of the legal system are not yet
measured by analytics meaning that the ‘truth’ of the
data itself is open to question. Courts are unique.
Courts are accountable through the rule of law and
the principle of open justice, and the need to avoid
‘counting’ the judiciary has been elegantly and forcefully
made by the judiciary themselves. As Chief Justice
Bathurst of NSW states, the judiciary is already account-
able as: ‘Judges have ‘explanatory’ accountability in their
obligation to provide open, public justice and reasons
explaining their decisions, ‘content’ accountability in
terms of the appellate process and ‘probity’ accountabil-
ity in terms of their use of public resources’.27
While this observation was made in the context of
retrospective analysis of judicial decision making, the
observation becomes more forceful when applied to
predictive analytics. Predictive analytics reduces the law
to numbers rather than focusing on the intangible con-
cepts of justice. As His Honour further observes, ‘in
judging the judges, the qualitative factors inherent in
the administration of justice, including the quality of judg-
ments and fairness of process, are taken into account’.28
Fairness is neither quantifiable nor predictable meaning
that the use of predictive analysis in law should be
approached with caution and care.
25Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘Law as Information in the Era of Data-Driven Agency’ (2016) 79(1) The Modern Law Review 1.
26Pamela Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke, ‘Litigants and Legal Representatives: A Study of Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia’ (2019)
41(1) Sydney Law Review 35; Law Council of Australia, The Justice Project (Final Report, August 2018) 48; Community Law Australia, Unaffordable and Out
of Reach: The problem of access to the Australian legal system (Report, July 2012) http://www.communitylawaustralia.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
CLA_Report_Final.pdf; Senate Standing Committees on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Legal Aid and Access to
Justice (Report, June 2004).
27Thomas Bathurst, ‘Who Judges the Judges, and how Should They be Judged?’ (Speech delivered at Law Society Opening of Law Term Dinner,
Parliament House, Sydney, 30 January 2019) 8 [24].
28Ibid 21 [64].
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Of course, these concerns do not mean that all sta-
tistical analyses of patterns in judicial decision making
should be rejected. The debate between the AFR and
the Federal Court discussed above demonstrates that
such analysis can bring to public consciousness patterns
of behaviour and efficiency. However, debate about
court performance is delicate and it should at least
acknowledge that it is the system that is subject to dis-
cussion rather than the performance of individual judges.
Judicial conduct is circumscribed by budgets, society and
the law. While judges will properly resist being influ-
enced by predictive analysis, given the requirements of
judicial independence and the basic tenets of our legal
system, data can be used to evaluate on a narrow range
of efficiency of process and outcomes.
The need for ethical guidelines
The French legislative response to judicial analytics is at
the extreme end of the regulatory spectrum. Given that
data analytics is a useful tool and in terms of the open
justice principle, upholds the rule of law,29 we do not
advocate prohibition of judicial predictive analytics or
any other legislative response. Indeed, given the data
scraping of publicly available documents by international
companies such as Premonition, to advocate this posi-
tion would be futile. Rather, we suggest the development
of ethical guidelines, promulgated by the courts, to set
standards for the creation, development and use of judi-
cial predictive analytics by academics, publishers, legal
commentators and government. We advocate the crea-
tion of guidelines to heighten awareness of the use of
data analytics and the responsibility that accompanies it
in law as much as in any other discipline or area of social
interaction.
Ethical guidelines should replicate the format of eth-
ical guidelines common in areas such as the regulation of
health and medical services. Similar to the National
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research,30 the
use of ethical guidelines for judicial and predictive ana-
lytics should be seen in the broader context of the over-
all governance of this area of research. Ethical guidelines
will not only provide a framework for all researchers,
legal or not, but also will guide the responsibility for the
ethical acceptability of any research undertaken for pri-
vate companies and public institutions. While a disadvan-
tage of ethical guidelines is a lack of formal sanction, the
advantage is that they set a code of behaviour and a
recognition of ethical obligations and standards. Ethical
conduct is more than maintaining a minimum standard. It
involves conducting research with respect for the law
and concern for fundamental principles such as the
rule of law.
A minimum aim of the ethical guidelines is to ensure
that judicial predictive analytics does not provide predic-
tive or opinion-based inferences that have ‘low verifiabil-
ity’ and that any inferences provided are ‘justified’ by the
data controller to establish their reasonableness. This
means that guidelines should proscribe the use of extra-
neous personal information about judges (eg, schools/
university attended; political and social associations;
interests). We consider this type of research to be
part of ‘fairness research’ in data science which has
three basic concepts: lack of bias, non-discrimination
and transparency.31
This is an approach recommended by Wachter and
Mittelstadt in relation to big data analytics generally.32
Wachter and Mittelstadt state that this justification pro-
cess would require disclosure of why the data used is a
normatively acceptable basis for inferences to be drawn;
why inferences drawn are relevant to the purpose for
which they are to be used and ‘whether the data and
methods used to draw the inferences are accurate and
statistically reliable.’33 Such an ethical obligation on the
providers of judicial and predictive analytics will discour-
age the provision of highly unreliable material or at the
very least set standards to allow for specific disclosure of
the limitations of analysis provided.
Conclusion
The open court principle, which supports the rule of law,
is not an end in itself. Openness ‘may yield where the
29Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke, ‘Open Justice, Efficient Justice and the Rule of Law: The increasing invisibility of special leave to appeal applications
in the High Court of Australia’, Federal Law Review (forthcoming).
30NHMRC, National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) (Web Page, 2018) www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines/publications/e72. See also
CSIRO, Artificial Intelligence: Australia’s Ethics Framework Discussion Paper (Web Page, 2019) https://consult.industry.gov.au/strategic-policy/artificial-intel
ligence-ethics-framework/supporting_documents/ArtificialIntelligenceethicsframeworkdiscussionpaper.pdf.
31Julia Stoyanovich, Serge Abiteboul and Gerome Miklau, ‘Data, Responsibly: Fairness, Neutrality and Transparency in Data Analysis’ (Conference
Paper, 19th International Conference on Extending Database Technology, 15–18 March 2016) https://openproceedings.org/2016/conf/edbt/paper-c.pdf.
32Sandra Wachter and Brent Mittelstadt, ‘A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI’ (2019)
Columbia Business Law Review 1.
33Ibid 90.
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paramount object that it serves – preserving the integ-
rity of the administration of justice – so requires’.34
While this statement is a reflection upon the open
court rule, the notion of limits which it entails is pre-
scient. We suggest that minimum expectations should be
set for the ethical use of judicial analytics in Australia.
Serious consideration must be given to whether the pro-
fession and the discipline of law should develop princi-
ples to meet sophisticated technological advances – to
be proactive and not reactive.
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